I am continuing my rebuttal of the Physicians for Life (PFL) article,
“In
Defense of Life: Rebuttals to Abortion Arguments.” In Part
1, I addressed the arguments directed at the bodily autonomy of
pregnant people. In this post, I am going to address the arguments
made about personhood and the ethics of forcing one’s religious
morality onto the general public.
My position on
prenatal personhood has not changed since my “Why
Abortion is Permissible” essay. I still have not found a
satisfactory account of personhood that establishes that the prenate
is a person with the same right to life as you and me. Likewise, I
still have not found a satisfactory account of personhood that
establishes prenates are not persons with the same right to life as
you and me.
One thing that does
strike me about debating prenatal personhood is that, especially for
the slave mongers, “personhood” serves as a secular stand-in for
ensoulment. This is partly because the anti-abortion stance is pushed
almost entirely by religious conservatives, the vast majority of whom
would argue God gives people their souls at conception. Or, if one
argues that abortion is permissible to a certain point of pregnancy
(e.g,. the “quickening”), that person often means this is the
point where the prenate has acquired personhood, or in religious
terms, a soul. And, usually, a religious person who believes that one
acquires a soul either at birth or sometime after birth, if they
object to abortion at all, do so on grounds other than prenatal
personhood. Physicians for Life, perhaps inadvertently, makes this
connection in its article, when it states, “It may not be possible
to prove that personhood or 'ensoulment' begins at conception;
however, you cannot prove that personhood does NOT begin at
conception.”
It also seems to me
that even though those who are nonreligious and do not believe in the
soul are also, in a sense, using personhood as a secular stand-in for
ensoulment. Let’s take Bob Seidensticker’s spectrum
argument. If someone has been debating abortion long enough, they
will sooner or later run across some variation of the saying, “An
acorn is not an oak tree.” Seidensticker develops this saying by
pointing out that there are many instances where we know there is a
spectrum, and that the thing on one end of that spectrum is certainly
not the same thing as that on the other end. While we may not be able
to pinpoint exactly where on the spectrum something becomes the other
thing, that does not invalidate the fact that, for example, an acorn
is not an oak tree. He suggests, and later
develops the thought that personhood is an emergent property,
rather than an inherent one. But in doing so, he is taking a position
that is not that far from what traditional
Christianity has said about ensoulment for more than 1900 years.
Given the
quasi-religious nature of the term “personhood” and its
beginning, I am going to engage the personhood portions of PFL’s
article using both secular and religious arguments. In doing so, I am
not saying I can prove that God exists, souls exist, and that they
are acquired at a particular point. Nor am I making an argument that
they do. I am taking this approach for two main reasons. First, I am
engaging the slave mongers on the basis of common ground. Second,
since I am going to engage the ethics of forcing one’s religious
stances on the general public, the contrast between my religious
views and the slave mongers is relevant to that discussion.
So, let’s start
with defining what a person for the purpose of this essay. A person
is a being whom, for whatever reason, it is presumptively wrong to
kill. With this definition, I want to highlight two aspects. First,
this does not assume that only humans, or even that humans in all
stages of life are persons. If that “whatever reason” applies to
other species, whether on Earth, other planets, or other dimensions,
then those species would be also be persons. It also means that the
“whatever reason” has to exist for the individual member of the
given species. So if that “whatever reason” does not apply to,
say, prenates, then it would not be presumptively wrong to kill them.
Second, to say it is
presumptively wrong to kill a person is not the same thing as saying
it is always wrong to kill them. It does mean that: 1) if it is
presumptively wrong to kill such a being, then such killing has to be
justified and 2) the reason for the wrongness of killing such a being
is not “because [insert situational circumstances].” In other
words, it is not presumptively wrong to kill non-person beings,
although there may be reasons other than personhood that will
generate moral outrage in the killing, (e.g., excessive cruelty). So
if we were to determine that, say, infants, are not persons, and we
still want to say killing them is wrong, we would have to do it on
grounds other than personhood.
But it also means
that killing persons is not always wrong either. It simply means the
general rule is that killing a person is wrong. Killing a person may
be justified, as in cases of self-defense or the execution of
murderers. What this means is that even if we determine it is
presumptively wrong to kill prenates, this would not in itself settle
the abortion debate. We would still have to determine whether
abortions are justified.
In “Why Abortion
is Permissible,” I wrote that I believe that humans probably do not
acquire personhood until birth. I base that position on Scripture,
especially Genesis 2:7//Moses 3:7//Abraham 5:7 and 3 Nephi 1:13. This
is consistent with the scriptural view that the “breath of life”
is what distinguishes the living from the dead (e.g., Genesis 7:22,
Job 33:4, Psalm 104:29, Ezekiel 37:10, and obliquely Ether 15:31).
Exodus 21:22-25 only mandates a fine for causing a miscarriage while
applying lex talionis should
further injury befall the pregnant person. Numbers 5:11-31 prescribes
a ritual whereby a jealous husband may make his wife undergo a trial
by ordeal that, if she fails, results in her womb discharging and her
uterus dropping, with no concern over the fact this will result in a
miscarriage if the wife is pregnant. Finally,
all those passages that require being born again as a condition of
salvation (e.g., John 3:3, Mosiah 27:25, Moses 6:59) presume one was
born the first time around. From Genesis to The Articles of Faith,
Scripture shows a remarkable lack of concern for prenatal life,
especially if we are meant to
believe a person has a soul from the moment of conception.i
This
scriptural view comports well with reason. It seems absurd that God
would bequeath a soul on a newly fertilized zygote when 73%
of them will not survive implantation
and be flushed out in the next menstrual cycle, and up to 3% more
will not make it until birth under normal circumstances. I
believe God is rational, and it staggers the imagination that God
would be so wasteful in distributing souls.
Furthermore,
ensoulment at conception raises unanswered questions. Consider
monozygotic
twins, where one zygote is split either naturally or artificially
into two or more embryos. If
ensoulment occurs at conception, that naturally leads to the
conclusion that each of the identical twins
split the one soul between
them. Yet
it is usually maintained identical twins are separate persons with
their own souls. However, this requires
mind-boggling ad hoc
explanations when the simpler explanation is that ensoulment occurs
sometime after conception.
Or
consider tetragametic
chimerism, which occurs
when two fraternal twins merge into one embryo. If ensoulment occurs
at conception, that naturally leads to the conclusion that the
tetragametic chimera has (at least) two souls. I
have yet to get a straight answer from a slave monger to the question
of how many souls a tetragametic chimera has. Hydatidiform
moles
also form from fertilized eggs, which, if ensoulment occurs at
conception, would mean it would be presumptively wrong to kill them.
Yet not even the most extreme slave monger goes this far, although
they can not give me a straight answer to why hydatidiform moles are
not persons.
The
simplest answer that would account for all these phenomena is that
the earliest point ensoulment
happens sometime after conception, and probably sometime after
implantation as well. It also seems most reasonable that if
ensoulment does occur before birth, it would happen at some point
where it is clear the fetus will
be born and survive in
the natural course of events. Anencephalic
fetuses
and sirenomelic
fetuses, to cite two examples, probably do not have souls.ii
With
these preliminaries out of the way, let us turn to the PFL
article. In section one, the
first argument is the slippery slope argument that
if you can not pinpoint exactly when you became a person, you need to
accept that you were a person from the moment of conception. This
argument is handled quite readily by the spectrum argument outlined
above. But given the
preliminaries I have established, we may be able to say more.
Recall
my definition of a person is a being that is presumptively wrong to
kill for whatever reason. Also recall that the “whatever reason”
which makes
a being presumptively wrong to kill may or may not apply to
the being at all stages of the being’s life. The implication of the
slippery slope argument presented here is that merely being human is
the “whatever reason.” However, this raises all sorts of
questions that the slave mongers have problems answering without ad
hoc explanations. For example,
what about hydatidiform moles, which are also began
with fertilization and also has nothing added to it except what is
provided by the person with a uterus’
body and the time to grow? But if it is not presumptively wrong to
kill the hydatidiform mole, that would suggest that merely being
human is not the “whatever reason” that makes something human a
person.
My
religious mythology points both to the “whatever reason” and
provides the cut off date for when a human becomes a person. In the
creation stories recounted in the books of Genesis, Moses, and
Abraham, God formed Adam from the dust of the ground. Adam had a human
body, but it was not a living soul until God breathed into his
nostrils the breath of life. When
Jesus told Nephi that he would come into the world the next day,
Jesus’ body already existed in the form of the fetus in Mary’s
womb. It was not until birth Jesus came into the world.
Obviously,
you do not have to accept my religious beliefs in this matter, and I
certainly do not expect Physicians for Life to accept my religious
beliefs, either. But this is an exercise you can perform for
yourself. If I were to ask you what makes a person a person, most of
you would probably respond with a list of traits, e.g., intelligence,
sentience, consciousness. Or you might respond by saying it is the
physical structures of the brain which gives us intelligence,
sentience, consciousness. Or you might have some other response. I am
not going
to dictate your “whatever
reason.” However, I
can say with a reasonable degree of certainty that however you answer
my question, your “whatever reason” either developed or was
acquired sometime after conception. And
this would mean even though you have been human since conception, you
were not always a person.
In
the next argument, PFL
points out that we can treat fetuses and even directly operate on
them for
conditions such as spina bifida. It urges the slave monger to ask who
the patient is in such cases. I honestly do not see the relevance
here. Since I have never reviewed patient listings for such cases, I
cannot answer that specific question. However, I have taken my dogs
to the vet, and it has
always been the dog that is identified as the patient, no matter what
vet I go to. Does this mean
my dog is a person?
I
would leave my answer at that, but there is something I want to
highlight about this argument. We
should ask the counter
question, “How does the doctor get to the fetus to operate on it?”
The answer, of course, is through the pregnant person’s body.
Notice how the pregnant person is totally ignored here. It’s almost
like only fetuses exist according to Physicians for Life. This is a
theme we will return to.
Physicians
for Life next urges the slave monger to ask pro-choice
advocates if they can provide a description of what it means to be
viable. Yes, I can—when the lungs are formed enough that the prenate can
breathe on its own outside the womb. I
call this natural viability because it is the definition that does
not rely on medical technology to make it true. Medical viability is
defined as the point where, given advanced medical technology, at
least half of neonates born at that stage will survive. While I have
reservations about this definition, I am not going to challenge it in this essay.
Either
way, I am not sure what point
PFL
is trying to make here. My guess, based on the next question, is that
the question is directed toward late-term abortions, which are rarely
performed and then for reasons of extreme fetal abnormality or
because of serious threats to the health or life of the mother
anyway. In the United States,
late-term abortions are usually limited to those reasons, thus asking
about viability is a moot point. In terms of personhood, the question
would only be relevant for those for whom the “whatever reason”
applies to pre-viability prenates anyway.
The
next argument goes directly into late-term abortion territory by
asking pro-choice advocates to consider the case of two people with
uteruses,
both of whom became pregnant the same day. One gives birth at six
months to a premature but healthy (unlikely, but I will grant it for
the sake of discussion) baby. The other decides a week later
(apparently just because this person is a heartless bitch) that they
do not want to have a baby. Then the pro-choice advocate is asked why
the first person could not kill the newborn but the
second person could be allowed to abort.
For
one answer, see the section addressing viability in “Why Abortion
is Permissible.” Does PFL
seriously think pro-choice advocates have never
thought about the question?
I’m guessing these slave mongers figure that even if the pro-choice
advocate does not believe the personhood does not begin at
conception, surely they would have developed or acquired personhood
by viability.
Physicians
for Life does not want the slave monger to accept
the answer that one is born
and the other is not on the grounds that this is merely a difference
in location. But in my religious beliefs, and speaking directly to
personhood, the born infant has acquired a soul while the fetus has
not. So for me to say because
one is born and the other is not does not just indicate a difference
in location. It indicates a
difference showing
that it is presumptively wrong to kill the infant while it is not
presumptively wrong to kill the fetus.
For
section one of the PFL
article, I have presented, as much as possible, answers to the slave
mongers’ arguments with both secular rebuttals and responses
derived from my religious beliefs. The
secular responses show their arguments do not prove anything about
prenatal personhood, while the religious responses help provide the
basis for a later argument down the road.
Section two has only
one argument, which is meant to address the pro-choice argument that
no one can say with certainty when a fetus becomes a person. I quoted
this section above while discussing personhood and ensoulment.
Acknowledging that ensoulment at conception cannot be proven, the
slave mongers’ argument is to “err on the side of life.”
At
first glance, this argument seems reasonable enough. But in fact, the
argument is deceptively cruel. Let me explain.
What
does it mean to err on the side of something? To err on the side of
caution
means not to take unreasonable risks so we are not injured or killed.
With regard to people, it means to give a person the benefit of the
doubt in dubious situations. For example, in criminal law, if jurors
find a reasonable doubt in the prosecutor’s case, they have the
duty to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt,
that is, to err on the
defendant’s side and find them not guilty. If someone tells you a
story that is not intrinsically implausible, you tend to believe that
story unless and until presented with evidence the story is not true.
Not only is this simpler than radical skepticism, but erring on the
side of
the storyteller’s truthfulness helps build personal relationships,
while explicitly or implicitly accusing the storyteller of lying
without evidence assaults their dignity for no good reason. To
err on the side of love is to treat others how you would like to be
treated instead of what you think they deserve. In
short, to err on the side of a person is to respect that person’s
rights and dignity.
This
is not what Physicians for Life is asking you to do if you doubt
prenatal personhood. What they are asking you to do is side with
may-or-may-not-be-a-person prenates against
unambiguously-a-person pregnant people. What they are asking you to
do is deprive pregnant people of their rights, including but not limited
to: their right
to life, liberty, and security of person; their right to be free from
slavery; their right to be recognized as a person before the law;
their right to equal protection under the law; their right to be free
from torture; their right to bodily integrity; and their right to
decide when and if to have children. And
they
are asking you to do this even
though the pregnant person has done nothing wrong, and in cases of
rape, even though it
is the
pregnant person who
has
been wronged.
Erring
on the side of life would be valid if the prenate had an independent
existence and all one had to do is let it be for it to develop on its
own. But this is not the case, and once again PFL
totally erases pregnant people as if they did not exist, did not have
rights of their own, and did not have interests of their own. To “err
on the side of life” in this case is to deny the personhood of the
pregnant people.
When
it comes to may-or-may-not-be-a-person prenates and
unambiguously-a-person pregnant people, it is clear whose side we
should err on: pregnant people.
Section
three is meant to address the pro-choice arguments that prenates may
be humans, but not necessarily persons. Here, I am going to combine
and respond to both tactics pressed here because they
are both the same tactic with different follow-up questions. Both
tactics encourage the slave monger to detail the differences between
a human and a person. Then based on the assumption that the
pro-choice advocates responses are also applicable to born people or
fails to actually distinguish humans from persons, asks questions
like, “What other groups of persons can be killed for any reason?”
I
will engage in some “philosophical
mumbo jumbo” for a moment, despite
the slave mongers’ desire to avoid it.
It is exceedingly difficult to get a handle on what exactly
constitutes a person. One thing we can be pretty sure about is that
human and person are not necessarily synonymous. I am not merely
talking semantics here. We can easily conceive of non-human persons
and it would not violate the law of noncontradiction. Even if we
cannot easily define what a person is, if characters like Kal-El,
Spock, Legolas, or E.T. really existed, we would have no problem
identifying them as persons. Setting aside these fictional
characters, serious arguments are being made that other existing
species qualify for personhood, especially bonobos and orca. Indeed,
traditional Jews, Christians, and Muslims certainly believe in a
non-human person: God. Still, the only beings universally recognized
as persons are members of Homo
sapiens.
Does
this
philosophical reflection get us anywhere here? Perhaps.
I would suggest that even if we cannot necessarily agree what a
person is,
we would know a person if we interacted with one, once communication
barriers like language differences were overcome.
This
leads to
a practical thought experiment that I think will help
answer the
questions PFL
want the slave mongers to press. Take any ten beings that are
universally
recognized as persons with the right to life. Now consider a newborn
infant and a fetus. For the purpose of this experiment, the infant is
not
unambiguously a person, that is, an infant's status as a person is
questionable. As in real life, the fetus’ status is not settled
either. What do all the beings who are unambiguously persons have in
common? All are homo
sapiens,
most certainly. All were conceived by a sperm combining with an egg
(at least so far), most certainly. They were all also actually born.
Now,
it is easy to see that prenates and infants both have the first two
things in common with beings universally recognized as persons with
the right to life. Infants, however have that third thing in common
with unambiguously recognized persons, whereas prenates do not.
Therefore, a neonate, even one born after only 23 weeks gestation, is
a person with the right to life, while the prenate, even at 23 weeks
gestation, is not. Birth does intrinsically change things.
On
the religious level, my answer is fairly simple. A person is a being
that has a soul. Not all members of the human species have souls,
because souls are acquired at birth. And the answers to the questions
flow naturally from there.
I
am going to skip the next section for now since it has nothing
directly to do with prenatal personhood. Section five presents the
pro-choice advocate saying, “The fetus is a potential life.” I do
not see this happening very often, and when it does, “life” is
usually used as a synonym for “person.”
In
any case, the slave monger’s response is to point out such a saying
would be insensitive and belittling to a person who has suffered
through a miscarriage. And for once, PFL
is absolutely right. Any person saying something like this to someone
who lost a wanted pregnancy should be chastised. One does not have
to
believe the prenate is a person to comfort and aid a person who lost
a pregnancy they wanted.
As
a side note, it is interesting that this is the only place in the
entire article where Physicians of Life actually treats pregnant
people as human beings. Apparently pregnant people are only persons
if they want their pregnancies and would grieve their loss. Either
way, the argument itself does not say anything about the personhood
of the fetus.
The
next argument is that dogs produce dogs, whales produce whales, and
nobody has any problem recognizing this. Why do pro-choice advocates
have problems recognizing the fetus is a human being since it was
produced by human beings? I have no problems in saying that a dog
zygote is a potential
dog.
We just do not have separate terms
for dog zygotes as we do with acorns and oak trees. A dog fetus is a potential dog
the same way a human fetus is a potential human being. But
until personhood is actualized for the human, it is not a human
being.
At
this point, I am going to skip over the other arguments and address
section twelve. I have already dealt with section nine in Part 1. I
will come back to the skipped sections in later post(s).
Section
twelve deals with the religious argument. Specifically, it is
attempting to answer the pro-choice advocate arguing against imposing
religious morality on people.
First,
let’s get the outright lie out of the way. Susan
B. Anthony did not call abortion “child-murder.” If she had
an opinion on (the legality of) abortion, she kept it to herself. She
was far more concerned that laws about abortion were being
promulgated even though those most directly affected by those laws
(i.e., women) had no vote on those laws.
Speaking
of which, one
thing really struck me when I first read Justice Harry Blackmun’s
majority opinion in Roe
v. Wade.
The opinion gave a historical overview of anti-abortion restrictions.
Interestingly enough, there were few legal restrictions on abortion
until the birth of feminism and anti-abortion measures became more
restrictive the more traction arguments for women’s
suffrage gained. I cannot definitively say whether this
association is causal
or casual,
but I am convinced that it is not coincidental.iii
PFL
does make the point there are also atheist and agnostic slave
mongers, but let’s face it, the anti-abortion movement is driven
primarily by religious people. Atheist and agnostic slave mongers are
so few
in number there would hardly be an abortion debate at all without
religious conservatives driving it.
Medical
textbooks do not define whether something is presumptively wrong to
kill, so PFL’s contention they need only consult one instead a
church to see if abortion is violently killing a person is merely
begging the question.
Now
we come to the final question of this section, which directly ties to
their main argument: “Would a religious argument favoring the
legalization of abortion be treated the same way as a religious
argument opposing it?” PFL acknowledges there are religions that
allow pregnant people to have abortions. And I certainly do agree
that the majority of laws are based on some moral code. But then it
goes on to make the absurd argument that legalizing abortion forces
immorality on them.
This
is why I detailed
my religious beliefs in an essay that is already overly long. It
should be obviously, painfully clear that my religion supports
abortion rights. So let’s say I became king of the world and
proclaimed that henceforth and forever abortion is to remain legal.
What am I forcing you to do? Nothing. What am I prohibiting you from
doing? Nothing. Which of your rights am I violating? None.
So
if I were to stake my case for legalized abortion on my religious
beliefs, would it be treated differently than a religious case
against it? I presume my argument would be treated more favorably,
but not because it
is a religious argument. It would be treated more favorably precisely
because my religious beliefs about abortion forces nothing on no one.
Even if my religious beliefs were dismissed by others as crazy, they
would acknowledge my beliefs hurt no one.
In
contrast, if PFL successfully imposes their religious views into law,
it forces pregnant people to gestate, effectively making them
state-sanctioned slaves to the prenate. In addition to violating the
rights I outlined above, it does so regardless of the pregnant
person’s religious
beliefs
about prenatal personhood. If
a pregnant person’s religious beliefs require them to have an
abortion in certain cases, PFL would outright violate that person’s
freedom of religion. And
that would require a damned good secular
case if we are going to accept a mass violation of pregnant people’s
rights, something PFL does not have.
In
my next post, I am hoping to mop up the rest of PFL’s argument, but
that will depend on long that essay is. I am hoping that, at most, I
will need only two more posts to completely deal with the PFL
arguments. Please continue to bear with me.
[Updated 14 Dec 2020; 22 June 2021; 30 June 2021; 26 Oct 2021]
iI
am, of course, aware of Scriptures or at least interpretations that
may indicate ensoulment happens sometime before birth. It is not my
intent here to do more than lay out a general outline of the
scriptural case for ensoulment at birth. However, I will note that
seemingly contrary passages, even if granted, do not require us to
push ensoulment back to conception.
iiIt
is not my intent to lay out all the fetal abnormalities that would
probably prevent ensoulment given this reasoning. It should also be
pointed out that even my stance that ensoulment occurs at birth can
be problematic under this reasoning as well. For example, there
are numerous birth defects where the infant would not survive for
long after birth but for modern medicine. One could ask whether such
infants were given souls only after modern medicine made it possible
for them to survive. Scriptures like Leviticus 27:6 and Numbers 3:15
may reflect a certain amount of uncertainty given
this problem.
iiiKatha
Pollitt makes the connection between the anti-abortion stance and
“women’s growing freedom and power.” However, she does not
make a specific link between Women’s Suffrage and the
criminalization of abortion in the late 19th century.
Pro: Reclaiming Abortion Rights (pp. 32-33). Picador. Kindle
Edition.