David and the Book of Mormon

I’ve been a student of religious studies since I was twelve years old. In fact, I had intended to get a degree in this field, but was unable to complete my formal education. I never lost my interest in the subject. Since I’m also a Mormon, I have a special interest in Mormonism. So, as a member of Academia.edu I frequently get reading suggestions on the topic of Mormonism.

This is how I came to read “Davidic References in the Book of Mormon as Evidence Against Its Historicity” by Kyle Robert Beshears.¹ There is really no way to sugarcoat this. It is a bad argument. It is a really bad argument. In fact, it is such an exceedingly bad argument that I wonder if a thesis like this would be accepted anywhere other than a place like SBTS.

I felt the thesis needed some kind of response. But I didn’t want to duplicate any other efforts, so I inquired if there were any existing responses to the thesis at the Mormon dialogue and discussion board. A fellow board member, Gary Jacobson, referred me to “Too Little or Too Much Like the Bible? A Novel Critique of the Book of Mormon Involving David and the Psalms” by Jeff Lindsay.²

I considered “Too Little or Too Much Like the Bible?” a fairly good response. My thoughts about the thesis tracked so well with Lindsay’s response that I wondered if should still write my own response. Ultimately, I decided that I can still contribute to the discussion. So, here we go.

In contrast to Lindsay, I am going to be tackling Beshears from an environmentalist perspective. That is to say that I agree with Beshears that the Book of Mormon is not an ancient document. So what am I doing “defending Book of Mormon historicity?”

There are a couple reasons. First, as I discussed in my “Environmental Theory” essay, environmentalists, especially religious environmentalists like myself, have a special duty to show our approach to the Book of Mormon is basically positive. Among other things, this means that religious environmentalists should be at the forefront of calling out and disposing of bad arguments, even from those we are in nominal agreement with. This is why I wrote “How Not to Do Book of Mormon Studies” and that is partly why I am responding to Beshears now. In a sense, I feel like I have an even bigger dog in this fight than Lindsay.

Second, I am not defending Book of Mormon historicity as such. While historicists could use the arguments I am going to make, ultimately my conclusion is Beshears’ evidence is not evidence of anything. This is as much an experiment in Book of Mormon interpretation as it is a response to Beshears. Beshears is correct that there are relatively few direct references to David in the Book of Mormon. But rather than being evidence against historicity, the lack of references is an important part of the picture the Book of Mormon paints for itself. As an environmentalist, I would say it contributes to the Book’s verisimilitude. A historicist might rather say that this picture points to historicity. If so, I would not complain.

Lindsay (32) and I are in complete agreement that Beshears neologism mormonic (2 n.2) is too close to “demonic” or especially “moronic” to be seen as anything other than pejorative.³ Beshears uses the excuse that the term “does away with the cumbersome phrasing of ‘Book of Mormon’ to describe its people, narrative, events, theology.” But if “Book of Mormon” is too cumbersome to use every time, there are perfectly good abbreviations that can be used instead. Indeed, Beshears uses one himself: BofM. I’m going to stick with that abbreviation throughout this essay.

Lindsay (32) gives a brief discussion dealing with Beshears’ repeated accusation of plagiarism, to which I have nothing to add.

Lindsay also gives a devastating critique to Beshears’ methodology by, among other things, pointing out that most biblical references to David are clustered in books telling David’s story, and that many books in the Bible don’t mention him at all (37-41). While this is good work, I have an even more fundamental problem with Beshears’ argument. The real problem is that even if the methodology weren’t so flawed, the entire approach is not evidence of anything.

Consider the structure of Beshears’ argument:

1. If the Book of Mormon has numerous references to David, this would be evidence for its historicity.

2. If the Book of Mormon does not have numerous references to David, this would be evidence against its historicity.

3. The Book of Mormon does not have numerous references to David.

4. Therefore, the evidence points against historicity.

Premise 1 is wrong. To demonstrate this, let’s look at Beshears’ own example of how historicists use thematic similarities in the Bible to “corroborate the anticipated continuity between Old and New World Jewish cultures”: Noel B. Reynolds’ “The Israelite Background of Moses Typology in the Book of Mormon.”⁴ First, notice Reynolds never said that the Moses typology was evidence of BofM historicity. The closest he came was to say that if Joseph Smith did it based on what was understood in the 1820s, “he probably would have gotten it wrong” (5). Also note that saying “it would make sense to criticize the Book of Mormon” for not having the typology is an entirely different thing than saying that would be evidence against historicity. Beshears is already trying to prove too much.

If you are a storyteller, and you are going to tell a story about, well, an exodus, you’re not going to go wrong by modeling the story on the Exodus. Regardless of the state of biblical scholarship at the time, it can’t be denied that the material was available to Joseph Smith. If Reynolds said the Exodus typology pointed to the historicity of the Book of Mormon, it would be all too easy to simply respond Joseph Smith drew it from the Bible.

Likewise, even if the Book of Mormon bristled with Davidic references, and those references reflected everything Beshears said it should, it still would not be evidence of anything. Whatever use the Book of Mormon made of David, it still couldn’t be denied that the material was available to Joseph Smith. Therefore, it can’t in itself be used as evidence of historicity.

It should go without saying that if the presence of something is not evidence of anything, then the absence of that that thing is not evidence of anything either.

If we can’t say the lack of Davidic references don’t prove anything vis a vis BofM historicity, is there nothing that can be said about this? To use Reynolds’ term, could we justifiably criticize the Book of Mormon for not having them? I propose this is going to depend on two factors. First, is the Book of Mormon really lacking in references to David? If so, does the Book of Mormon have a reason to avoid mentioning David?

Beshears is correct the Book of Mormon only directly mentions David seven times. I confirmed this by doing a search on a PDF version. In contrast, my preliminary⁵ counts yielded twenty-three references to Joseph, forty-nine mentions of Jacob, and seventy-five references to Moses. Beshears counted twenty-seven references to Abraham (19). Mentions of David certainly do pale by comparison.

Direct mentions probably don’t fully do the job, however. We should also take into account allusions as well. For example, Ben McGuire makes a case that the killing of Laban (1 Ne. 3:31–4:19) has several deliberate allusions to the story of David and Goliath (1 Sam. 17).⁶ If this deliberate modeling does not count as a reference to David, then naming a land after him (Morm. 2:5) probably doesn’t either. There may well be more of these types of allusions to David, so this is a subject that could use further exploration. Even so, I don’t think we will find enough such allusions to say the Book of Mormon is under the long shadow of David, especially not in the way we could say this of Moses.

Should we count quotations or allusions to Psalms attributed to David as Davidic references? Beshears asserts there are no direct quotes from the Psalms⁷ and that possible allusions to them are problematic at best (41-44). So answering this question requires delving into at least one controversy.⁸ Even if we resolve the question of whether the Psalms are quoted or alluded to,⁹ that still would not necessarily mean they should count as Davidic references. Since the argument I’m going to make could account for such quotations or allusions (assuming they exist), I will set this question aside for now.

Especially when setting aside that question, I think it safe to say David is not emphasized in the Book of Mormon. That answers the first question. Now let’s turn to the second. Does the Book of Mormon have a reason to avoid mentioning David? I think it does.¹⁰

The Book of Mormon begins in “the first year of the reign of Zedekiah” (1 Ne. 1:4). Zedekiah was installed by King Nebuchadnezzar after a disastrous battle with Zedekiah’s nephew Jehoiachin. Besides installing Zedekiah, Nebuchadnezzar exiled at least ten thousand people to Babylon, leaving only “the poorest of the land” (2 Kgs. 24:10-20).¹¹ Among these captives was the prophet Ezekiel (Ezek. 1:2).

For Jerusalem, this was just the latest in a series of disasters. First, King Josiah was killed in battle with Pharaoh Neco (2 Kgs. 23:29). Then Neco subsequently dethroned Jehoahaz, imposed a heavy tribute on Jerusalem, and installed Jehoiakim to the throne (2 Kgs. 23:33-34). Jehoiakim. either by choice or by force, switched allegiance to Nebuchadnezzar, only to rebel with calamitous consequences to Jerusalem (2 Kngs. 24:1-7).

Since these disasters all occurred in a space of no more than twenty years, this is the environment the Book of Mormon portrays Nephi and his brothers growing up in. And it is in this environment that Lehi began prophesying.¹² However, unlike Jeremiah (26:16-24; 36:11-19; 37:16-21, 38:1-28), Lehi did not have any protection from institutional sources. Lehi was on his own against those who mocked him and “sought his life” (1 Ne. 1:19-20).

So on the eve of Lehi’s departure from Jerusalem, no one in his party had reason to hold the Davidic monarchy in high regard. For all their complaints and desire to return to Jerusalem, Laman and Lemuel never said a word about its leadership. There are some clues in the Bible that the sentiment was widespread. The final four kings of Judah are not compared to David (2 Kngs. 23:31-24:20). Jeremiah clearly rejected the monarchy of his day, instead promising the Lord would raise a “righteous Branch” after the coming exile (22:24-23:6). In the aftermath of Jerusalem’s destruction, Ezekiel affirms the Davidic covenant (34:24), but the role and power of the “prince” are greatly reduced in his vision of the restored Israel (45:7-46:18). The book of Nehemiah, set during the post-exilic Persian period, identified David only as “the man of God”(12:24); Solomon is identified as “king” while emphasizing his sin in taking foreign wives (13:26).

Let’s back up a little. Nephi was originally commanded to start making his record between thirty and forty years after he left Jerusalem (2 Ne. 5:28-34). Within a few leaves of this record, we are told he received a revelation telling him he would “be made a ruler and a teacher over thy brethren” (1 Ne. 2:22). This revelation was later confirmed to Laman and Lemuel by an angel (1 Ne. 3:29). Despite this, a recurring complaint made by the two brothers is that Nephi was taking it upon himself to be a ruler over them (e.g., 1 Ne. 16:37-38; 18:10). Nephi’s final break with his brothers was precipitated by yet another such jealous outbreak (2 Ne. 5:3-5).

As noted above, the story of the killing of Laban seems deliberately modeled after the story of David and Goliath. When the people desire that Nephi be made a king, he tries to demur but humbly says “I did for them that which was in my power”¹³ (2 Ne. 5:18). Nevertheless, he could not seem to resist the impulse to note this was in fulfillment of prophecy (2 Ne. 5:19). Whatever reluctance Nephi had about being king did not prevent him from anointing a successor “according to the reigns of the kings”(Jacob 1:9). As Beshears himself notes, three of the references to David occur in the extensive copying of Isaiah in 2 Nephi. We can agree with him that “had Isaiah not mentioned David in those three verses, one wonders if Nephi would have ever mentioned the king at all, and the near-absense of Davidic references outside of this section in the BofM inclines one to suppose he would not have” (37). Interestingly, one of those mentions, 2 Ne. 19:7 (Isa. 9:7), does affirm the Davidic covenant, but as Beshears notes, Nephi makes nothing of this (37). This someone trying to establish his legitimacy to the throne.

As Nephi (and probably Zoram and Sam) die, a new problem arises. Nearly everyone in the budding Nephite community was either born in the sojourn out of Jerusalem or in the promised land. No one had any memories of Jerusalem in the final years leading to its destruction. What they did have were the brass plates.

We do not have an exact picture the brass plates’ contents. We can only assemble this picture through what the Book of Mormon specifically tells us and what is quoted or clearly alluded to. One of the things it tells us is that the brass plates contained “a record of the Jews from the beginning, even down to the commencement of the reign of Zedekiah” (1 Ne. 5:12). This would appear to mean they had something like 1 Samuel, 2 Samuel, 1 Kings, and 2 Kings up to chapter twenty-four.¹⁴

Again, exactly what is in the version of these books is unknown. However, it does seem that the Book of Mormon pictures the Nephites having some version the Davidic Covenant as presented in 2 Samuel 7. This will bring us to the three clearest mentions of David other than the Isaiah quotations in the Book of Mormon.

2 Samuel 7 starts with David proposing to build a temple for the Lord (v. 2). The prophet Nathan originally approves (v. 3), but then has a dream where the Lord tells him it will be David’s son that will build the temple and specifically says of this son, “I will be a father to him, and he shall be a son to me” (v. 13-14). Moreover, the Lord adds “Your house and your kingdom shall be made sure forever before me; your throne shall be established forever” (v. 16).

This seems particularly important for a couple reasons. First, it inextricably binds David and Solomon together. Second, it raises a note of illegitimacy to the Nephite kings.¹⁵

The Nephite community clearly regard David and Solomon as role models. It’s hard to think of them justifying their polygamous practices because of them otherwise. It is also hard to see any other place in the Bible that the Nephites would have had that so inextricably bind David and Solomon together. This would explain why the next few BofM Davidic references we are going to consider (Jacob 1:15, 2:23, 24) put them together.¹⁶

Note how Jacob sets the stage leading into the references to David and Solomon. First, he writes that Nephi anoints a new king before dying (Jacob 1:9). Next he comments that the people held Nephi I in such regard that subsequent kings (up to the fourth as of the time Jacob wrote) had Nephi as their regnal name (Jacob 1:10-11). So Jacob is writing well after the time he presents the sermon in Jacob 2-3. A dynasty has been established, which will last until the death of Mosiah₂ (Mosiah 29:38ff).

After relaying this information, Jacob discusses the circumstances of the sermon he gives in Jacob 2-3. He backs up to the “reign of the second king,” and discusses how he became concerned with “wicked practices, such as like unto David of old desiring many wives and concubines, and also Solomon, his son” (Jacob 1:15). And when Jacob discusses David and Solomon, he lets loose:

For behold, thus saith the Lord: This people begin to wax in iniquity; they understand not the scriptures, for they seek to excuse themselves in committing whoredoms, because of the things which were written concerning David, and Solomon his son.

Behold, David and Solomon truly had many wives and concubines, which thing was abominable before me, saith the Lord. (Jacob 2:23-24)

Looking at the sermon’s placement in the Book of Mormon, Jacob seems to be trying to kill two birds with one stone. The first, of course, is to record the start of his campaign against Nephite polygamy. The second is to help establish the legitimacy of the Nephite kings by castigating David and Solomon.¹⁷

Fast forward a couple hundred years or so. Warned to leave the land of Nephi, Mosiah₁ leads his people through the wilderness until they discover the people of Zarahemla. The people of Zarahemla are described as leaving Jerusalem in the wake of Zedekiah’s final defeat (Omni 12-14). The leader of this party is later identified as Mulek, and specifically called “the son of Zedekiah” (Hel. 6:10). The people of Zarahemla and the people of Mosiah₁ come to an accommodation which results in Mosiah₁ becoming the king of both (Omni 19).

However, this presents another problem. Now the Nephites have legitimate heirs to the kingdom of the house of Israel among them.¹⁸ Furthermore, the text later notes that: 1) the Nephites are a minority in Zarahemla and 2) the combined population of Zarahemla was less than half that of the Lamanites (Mosiah 25:3). This puts the Nephite monarchy in the horns of a dilemma. Emphasize David too much, and Mulek’s descendants might start getting ideas. But they definitely need the people of Zarahemla, so outright badmouthing Mulek’s ancestor would not be wise. Better to avoid mentioning him at all. Might that explain how the small plates seem to have gotten lost (W of M 3)? 

Fast forward another couple generations. Mosiah₂ has come to a point in his reign where it time to appoint a successor. The problem was that none of his sons wanted the throne (Mosiah 29:3). Rather than anointing one of his brothers (Mosiah 1:2), hypothetical nephews, or even someone outside the family (Alma₂ would have been a popular candidate, as shown by Mosiah 29:42), Mosiah proposes a radical change in government.

Instead of continuing the monarchy, Mosiah proposes that instead of continuing the monarchy, the people themselves should choose judges. In making his argument, Mosiah attacks the very idea of monarchy. Acknowledging that if the people always had a “just man” ruling over them, monarchy would be an “expedient” form of government (Mosiah 29:11), Mosiah emphasizes that the consequences of having a wicked man on the throne are too great:

And if my son should turn again to his pride and vain things he would recall the things which he had said, and claim his right to the kingdom, which would cause him and also this people to commit much sin.

…

For behold, how much iniquity doth one wicked king cause to be committed, yea, and what great destruction!

Yea, remember king Noah, his wickedness and his abominations, and also the wickedness and abominations of his people. Behold what great destruction did come upon them; and also because of their iniquities they were brought into bondage.

…

And behold, now I say unto you, ye cannot dethrone an iniquitous king save it be through much contention, and the shedding of much blood.

For behold, he has his friends in iniquity, and he keepeth his guards about him; and he teareth up the laws of those who have reigned in righteousness before him; and he trampleth under his feet the commandments of God;

And he enacteth laws, and sendeth them forth among his people, yea, laws after the manner of his own wickedness; and whosoever doth not obey his laws he causeth to be destroyed; and whosoever doth rebel against him he will send his armies against them to war, and if he can he will destroy them; and thus an unrighteous king doth pervert the ways of all righteousness. (Mosiah 29:8, 17-18, 21-23)

The people ratified Mosiah’s proposal, and the era of judges began. But within five years, Amlici had gathered enough of a following that he was able to force an election for his effort to be declared king. In what appears to be a fairly close vote,¹⁹ Amlici lost. Instead of accepting the voice of the people, Amlici started a civil war, which ultimately led to his death (Alma 2).

Less than twenty years after that, Amalickiah and his followers aspired to kingship in the wake of a dispute with the high priest Helaman₂. This time, there would be no election. Under the leadership of Moroni₁, the Nephites immediately took up arms against Amalickiah and his followers, forcing them to flee. Amalickiah himself made good his escape, but many of his followers were captured and forced to swear allegiance to the existing regime on pain of death (Alma 46).

They evidently did not keep this oath. Within a few years, they were attempting to change the government into a monarchy yet again. Again, this was put to the voice of the people. This time, the vote was so overwhelmingly against the king-men they were forced to keep their peace. However, in the face a Lamanite invasion, the king-men refused to be conscripted. Moroni₁ in turn diverted resources to root out a potential fifth column (Alma 51).

During the course of the war, it appears another group managed to force the chief judge, Pahoran, out of power and out of Zarahemla.²⁰ This group installed Pachus as king of Zarahemla. Again, Moroni₁ had to divert forces back to Zarahemla in order to deal with the problem (Alma 61-62).

The final attempt to establish a king over the Nephites was both a success and a failure. A complaint against lower judges was brought to the chief judge in Zarahemla. These judges were brought to Zarahemla to stand trial. However, their supporters formed a conspiracy overthrow the government and establish a king. They were successful in murdering the chief judge. This caused the entire government to collapse.

However, the conspirators were unable to take advantage. Instead of getting behind the conspiracy’s leader, the people simply divided into tribes. The leader was proclaimed king of his group, but realized he did not have enough power to unite the tribes under his leadership. As a result, his people migrated out of the land. However divided Nephite society had become, it was clear the last thing they wanted was a king (3 Ne. 6:25-7:14).

This review of the BofM’s plot suggests there are good reasons why it doesn’t mention David very often. The political situation described throughout the narrative militates against it. Lehi’s party had personal reasons not to be too enthusiastic about the Davidic monarchy. The Davidic covenant attached a note of illegitimacy to the entire Nephite monarchy from Nephi to Mosiah, such that Nephi had to justify his rulership and Jacob bolstered the monarchy by castigating David and Solomon. Later, Nephite society included legitimate Davidic heirs and the monarchy could not afford to give them ideas but also could not afford to badmouth David either. After transitioning to a more democratic form of government, Nephite society became plagued with demagogues seeking to become kings. This is not a society that is going to promote David—the paragon of Israelite kings.

This does not mean that Nephite society had no regard for David. They did name a “land” after him (Morm. 2:5), which suggests, contra Beshears, that the Book of Mormon does not merely fixate “on the ancient monarch’s practice of polygamy as a sinful abomination” (45). Even ignoring his status as king, David’s accomplishments were such that he was more than worthy of having a land named after him. In fact, we can’t even be certain from the text whether Jacob’s sermon circulated widely enough for this to be a major part of the way the Nephites thought of David.

This argument extends to the BofM’s utilization of the Psalms. One can admire David the psalmist while also retaining a hands-off attitude toward David the king. We moderns can acknowledge someone’s achievements and art even while recognizing they weren’t very good people.

Beshears believes the Book of Mormon can be criticized for not saying anything about David’s role as the messiah’s progenitor. But such a criticism would still be misplaced. As Beshears himself points out, the Book of Mormon presents an “uncanny level of propehtic insight that these [BofM] prophets practiced is breathtaking in comparison to the shadowy predictions of the biblical prophets. While the Old World Jews yearned for a vague, future Davidic messiah, the New World Jews eagerly awaited Jesus Christ by name and date” (22-23). This is reason enough not to expect Nephite prophecy and preaching would discuss David as Jesus’ ancestor.

Consider what it means to predict the Messiah will be the son of David. It gives the hearer something to look for to and/or a means of testing a particular person’s claim to be the Messiah. But the Nephites knew that Jesus’ entire mortal life would be lived in the Old World. That disqualifies everyone in the New World, including the descendants of Mulek, who are portrayed as sons of David. Emphasizing Jesus as the son of David would literally have no meaning to the Nephites.

To sum things up, Beshears’ basic argument is not sound. Davidic references would not show anything about BofM historicity, so lack of such references would not show anything either. Even a softer version of his argument, that it could be justifiably criticized for lacking those references, would not work very well either. Given the BofM’s dominant anti-monarchical theme, mentioning David too frequently and too approvingly would be contraindicated. In fact, doing so would actually be too jarring in its narrative. Instead of being a shortcoming, the lack of Davidic references contributes to its verisimilitude precisely because the lack of such references contributes to the development of one of the Book of Mormon’s major themes. 

NOTES

1(master’s thesis, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2016).

2Interpreter: A Journal of Mormon Scripture 29 (2018): 31-64. Page references are to the PDF version available on the website.

3I frequently found myself eliding the second m and reading “moronic” time and again while reading the thesis.

4BYU Studies 44, no. 2 (2005): 5-23.

5I have to emphasize preliminary. Joseph and Jacob are both mentioned in the Book of Mormon, but the Book of Mormon also has other characters named Joseph and Jacob. I could have easily erred in counting or discounting references. Likewise, many mentions of Jacob and Moses occur in the formulaic forms of “God of … Jacob” and “law of Moses.” I counted them, but an argument could be made that I should not have.

6Ben McGuire, “Nephi and Goliath: A Case Study of Literary Allusion in the Book of Mormon,” Journal of the Book of Mormon and Other Restoration Scripture 18/1 (2009): 16–31.

7Notably, Lindsay does not dispute this. For the purpose of this essay, I’ll take this to mean Beshears is correct.

8Another source of controversy would be the fact Beshears obviously assumes Davidic authorship of the Psalms attributed to him. I do not.

9For the record I think they are. But whatever problem Beshears thinks using the King James Version wording has for BofM translation and/or historicity, it is not a problem for the Book of Mormon itself. If it made deliberate allusions to the Psalms, as pictured in the Book of Mormon the characters had access to them. That in itself would answer Beshears argument they did not.

10Compare Lindsay’s explanation in “Too Much or Too Little?” 56-63. I draw on some of the same facts as Lindsay, but I’m taking an entirely different approach.

11All biblical quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version unless otherwise noted.

12We should not discount the possibility the Book of Mormon pictures Lehi having his own grudge against Josiah, whether or not we accept Lindsay’s argument he was “at odds with the Deuteronomists and their scribes” (58). Given Lehi’s probable age and the fact he was a Jospehite (1 Ne. 5:14), he may have been at least indirectly affected by Josiah’s invasion of Samaria (2 Kngs. 23:15-20).

13Compare 1 Sam. 10:20-24.

14Responding to an earlier version of this essay, Ben McGuire reminded me that these books were actually post-exilic and could not realistically be on the brass plates. I am aware of this, but I have other reasons for being tentative here. Even from an environmentalist perspective, it is difficult to ascertain what Joseph Smith imagined was in the brass plates. I personally think Smith had some kind of ur-text of our present books in mind without worrying overmuch about the exact contents.

15Alexander Campbell seemed to have sensed the problem: “He [Joseph Smith] has more of the Jews, living in the new world, than could have been numbered any where else, even in the days of John the Baptist; and has placed them under a new dynasty. The sceptre, with him, has departed from Judah, and a law-giver from among his descendants, hundreds of years before Shiloh came….” Campbell is alluding to Gen. 49:10. Alexander Campbell, Delusions. An Analysis of the Book of Mormon with an Examination of Its Internal and External Evidences, and a Refutation of Its Pretences to Divine Authority (Boston: Benjamin H. Greene, 1932), 12.

16Interestingly, Solomon himself is only mentioned six times in the Book of Mormon. The first two come in the same verse describing the first temple the Nephites built—the very temple Jacob will be preaching at (2 Ne. 5:16). The next three references are in the passage we now considering. The final reference (3 Ne. 13:29) is a quotation of Matthew 6:29.

17Compare/contrast BMC Team, “What Does the Book of Mormon Say About Polygamy?”

2 Sam. 12:8 specifically says God gave David at least some of his wives. This fact seems to have escaped Jacob’s notice, but exactly why this is so is unknown.

At the meta-narrative level, perhaps Joseph Smith didn’t know or recall this fact when writing the Book of Mormon. However, the Joseph Smith Translation passes over the verse without modification, so he may not have sensed a contradiction.

How this plays out in the Book of Mormon narrative is another matter. Perhaps the verse was not present on the brass plates. Or perhaps Jacob deliberately ignored it, but this opens the possibility of the Nephite polygamists throwing the verse back at him. Later, King Noah and his priests are portrayed as having multiple wives and concubines, but this is blamed on Noah’s own lust without reference to David and Solomon (Mosiah 11:2-4). So it would appear Jacob’s denunciation had some effect.

Ben McGuire suggested another possibility to me, that Lehi’s commandment of monogamy superseded the practices of the Old World. In this context, see Jacob 3:5, where the Lamanites are praised for keeping that commandment.

18It should be remembered that though 1 Kings 12 presents Jeroboam’s rebellion as authorized by God, Israel’s kings were never truly considered legitimate. Visions of the restored Davidic monarchy always portray its rulership of the reunited house of Israel.

19It is difficult to believe that both members and non-members of the church would be so alarmed by Amlici’s campaign (Alma 2:3) unless it had a real chance of succeeding. The church members’ alarm is explicitly identified as caused by Amilici’s “intent to destroy the church of God” (Alma 2:4). The cause of the non-members’ concern isn’t specifically identified. The fact Amlici was able to form his followers into an army suggests both he didn’t lose in a landslide and he thought he could win through force of arms. Compare the parallel story in Alma 51, where the king-men are reduced to simply refusing military service in the face of a Lamanite invasion.

20Pachus and his followers are pictured as a distinct group than the king-men of Alma 51. Alma 62:9 notes the “men of Pachus” being tried, “and also those king-men who had been taken and cast into prison” during Moroni₁’s purge.

Consent, Sex, and the Clit: A Response to Beckwith and Thomas

Since writing Why Abortion Is Permissible, I have been more or less looking out for counterarguments as a means of testing the strength of my argument. As of this writing, that post has generated 374 comments, but even the most serious attempts to attack the argument tended to delve into issues that have no direct bearing on the argument itself. In other forums, the slavers mostly characterized the argument as absurd but demurred my challenge that it should be easy to prove me wrong. I made a list of the things I thought it would take to defeat the argument and even came up with a new variation on the Responsibility Objection. But nobody even tried to make such arguments.

As I mentioned in the update to that post, I eventually came across references to and eventually read Eileen L. McDonagh’s Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent.¹ Among other things, this expanded my search for counterarguments. Since our arguments are so similar, criticism of her work could have implications for mine.

This approach is starting to bear fruit. I came across Francis J. Beckwith and Steven D. Thomas’ “Consent, Sex, and the Prenatal Rapist: A Brief Reply to McDonagh's Suggested Revision of Roe v. Wade” quite by accident. I was reading another paper not actually expecting it to directly reply to McDonagh. But it did, adopting Beckwith and Thomas’ counterexamples wholesale while further manipulating the scenarios to establish its own points. Parts of it didn’t quite make sense, so I began a search for the original.

Beckwith and Thomas (hereafter B&T) are obviously responding to McDonagh rather than my argument. While our arguments are very similar, meaning B&T’s arguments have implications for mine, the differences are such that it does not necessarily follow that if their argument is successful against her, it is also successful against me. However, since I don’t think their arguments are successful against McDonagh, I shall make very little reference to my argument except for illustrative purposes. Note: I am using gender terms either as in the originals or in a strictly biological sense. No implication about transgender or nonbinary persons should be drawn from said usage.

Before looking at the specifics of B&T’s argument, I would remiss in not pointing out that B&T are making a strawman out of McDonagh’s arguments. They directly acknowledge at the beginning of their paper and later directly quote McDonagh specifying that it is nonconsensual pregnancy that is comparable to rape, assault, and other bodily violations. Yet the nonconsensual part repeatedly drops out of their discussion.

So a stated purpose of the counterexamples is to show that “pregnancy, unlike rape, is not a prima facie harm.” But McDonagh never said it was. They say they are “[a]dopting McDonagh’s understanding of pregnancy as morally equivalent to rape in assault” for their first counterexample, but McDonagh isn’t saying this at all. Part of the supposed contrast between “the traditional pro-choice position” is that position acknowledges that pregnancy could be good, whereas McDonagh turns pregnancy into rape, so it can’t be a good at all. But again, she never does this.

McDonagh is saying pregnancy can be good or bad, and the distinction turns on whether it is consensual. In the same manner, the distinction between sex (good) and rape (bad) is whether it is consensual. To be sure, she is unsparing in describing what a fetus does to a person during pregnancy. While that does illustrate the magnitude of the fetus’ assault when the pregnancy is nonconsensual, it also demonstrates the great generosity of the person who does consent to the pregnancy.

B&T’s response to McDonagh has two parts. The first part is divided into two counterexamples which are both apparently meant to be reductio ad absurdum arguments.² In the first counterexample, B&T takes a point made by McDonagh, that a nonconsensual pregnancy is like rape and needs to be treated the same way, and attempts to show this has absurd consequences. In the second, they attempt to show that if we are treating the conceptus as a full member of the moral community, a woman cannot withdraw consent to a pregnancy when paternity is in doubt because that would substantially risk killing the wrong and therefore innocent person. Exactly what B&T are trying to do in the second part is a bit unclear, but the means they are using is clear. They are attempting to use the teleological premise that the purpose of sex is procreation to assert that consent to sex is consent to pregnancy. The strange sound you heard when I originally read the paper was me rolling my eyes and heavily groaning.

The first counterexample looks at a point McDonagh pressed about a suggestion that a pregnant person should simply wait until birth, at which time the coercive pregnancy will end. “This type of reasoning is akin to suggesting that a woman being raped should wait until the rape is over rather than stopping the rapist. Nonconsensual pregnancy, like nonconsensual sexual intercourse, is a condition that must be stopped immediately because both processes severely violate one’s bodily integrity and liberty” (11-12).³

Taking McDonagh seriously, B&T propose the following scenario:

A young woman is involved in a car accident and is rendered unconscious by her injuries. She is brought to a hospital where, still comatose, she is examined by a doctor. While performing some tests, the doctor determines that the woman has been pregnant for several weeks. Furthermore, suppose that evidence comes to light to suggest that the woman is unaware of her pregnancy—perhaps her close friends know nothing of the pregnancy, her diary shows no knowledge of being pregnant, and so on.

Given these circumstances, what is the doctor’s obligation here? B&T argue that if we follow McDonagh’s argument to its conclusion, the physician is obligated to immediately perform an abortion and tell the woman after she wakes up. In other words, since there is no good evidence the pregnancy was consensual, the doctor must assume it is not and act accordingly. But this could also wind up being a serious violation of the woman’s bodily integrity.

You may be inclined to respond, “Why not just wait until she wakes up and ask?” If so, you are not taking the situation seriously enough. If you came across a man having sex with an unconscious woman, would you wait until she wakes up to see if she consents to the sex? No, you would immediately intervene and stop the man. If nonconsensual pregnancy is akin to rape and they should be treated similarly, then the doctor is obligated to perform the abortion immediately.

McDonagh seems to be in trouble and my argument can’t sidestep the problem. Fortunately, these situations are not actually analogous and B&T’s argument is fatally flawed.

Focus on the man having sex with the unconscious woman. What makes us so sure that we should intervene now rather than wait for the woman to wake up and ask her if she consents to the sex? Because having sex with an unconscious person is by definition rape! See, for example, California Penal Code 261.

Contrast this with what is presented to the doctor. The doctor is treating an unconscious woman who happens to be pregnant. The doctor does not know whether the patient consents to the pregnancy. For all the doctor knows, the woman herself doesn’t know she is pregnant. Contra B&T, this is not good evidence consent had not been given and that she is therefore under assault. By itself, it’s not evidence of anything.

Consider a situation that is more analogous to the doctor’s case. A police officer sees that a passenger in a moving car is sleeping. The officer does not know whether the passenger is in the car voluntarily. This is a possible kidnapping situation. What is the officer’s obligation to the sleeping passenger? Should the officer immediately pull the car over and slap some cuffs on the driver until the passenger wakes so he can ask whether they are being transported consensually? Of course not! The fact the passenger is sleeping is not in itself evidence of anything.

This counterexample was intended to show that McDonagh’s argument was “ill-formed.” However, there are relevant differences in the cases that mandate they be treated differently. Since having sex with a sleeping person is by definition rape, one needs no further evidence before intervening. An unknown pregnancy is not by definition nonconsensual, so one does need further evidence before proceeding.

Moving on to B&T’s second counterexample:

Imagine if a woman were raped by her husband’s identical twin brother within five hours after having unprotected sex with her husband. Suppose that she and her husband engaged in sex for the express purpose of procreating a child. A month later she discovers that she is pregnant, but she does not know, and cannot know, if the child’s father is her husband or the rapist. Would she be justified in having the abortion? Apparently not, according to McDonagh, for there would be a 50/50 chance that she would be killing an innocent person, someone whom she consented to let live in her body.

This is wrong on so many levels that I hardly knew where to begin! We will start by saying the anonymous referee quoted by B&T is not wrong in saying that since the woman withdraws her consent now, she can have an abortion. But we will deal with this later. B&T contend that the referee missed the point, so we will continue here to show that they are just plain wrong on their own terms. The real point, according to B&T, is that the conceptus conceived with her husband “was an invited guest,” and to have an abortion now risks a 50/50 chance the woman is killing an innocent person.

The problem here is that it is impossible for the conceptus to be an invited guest. In order to be an invited guest, one must be somewhere that the host can issue the invitation. In other words, the potential guest must exist. I can’t invite Batman into my home because Batman doesn’t exist! As Judith Jarvis Thomson pointed out more fifty years ago, unborn persons aren’t floating about somewhere where a couple could say to it, “Come on in!”⁴

If we can’t say the prenate was invited, what can we say that preserves the original scenario as closely as possible? The closest we come is to say that preclearance was granted should the woman become pregnant. But preclearances are often conditioned by certain factors being met. Is this the case here? Let’s attend closely to the scenario.

B&T specifically stipulated that “she and her husband engaged in sex for the express purpose of procreating child.” Implicit here is that they had sex under conditions that would ensure that the husband would be the father if pregnancy resulted. Remember, the woman did not know she would be raped five hours later. Based on their actions, this would mean that the preclearance was conditioned on the certainty the husband would be the father. But since she was raped and now doesn’t know and cannot know who the father is, the conditions of the preclearance have not been met. That means she does not consent to let the conceptus live in her body, regardless of who the father actually is. She would be justified in having the abortion, even on B&T’s own terms.

At this point we need not continue with B&T’s extension of the counterexample to the possibility of executing the wrong identical triplet. That comparison depends on establishing with certainty the exact identity of the rapist, but since we’ve established the exact identity of the conceptus is irrelevant, there is no need to belabor the point.

Curiously, B&T anticipates a possible response by writing “If … McDonagh were to say … that the pregnant woman may withdraw her consent at any time…” (emphasis added). We need not wonder about this, since McDonagh outright said this:

What is more, pregnancy is an ongoing condition, defined by a series of ways in which the implanted, fertilized ovum initiates and maintains massive bodily changes in the woman. As such, it requires not just a woman’s initial consent but also her ongoing consent in tandem with the ongoing bodily changes involved. Pregnancy based on consent, therefore, does not constitute either a binding contract or a binding promise—what the law calls an estoppel by promise. (79)

In any case, B&T are reduced to complaining:

A consent that can be withdrawn at any time for any reason or for no reason—even if it results in the death of a mentally immature, rights-bearing, human being that one intentionally brought into existence and invited to be placed in a vulnerable position—is no “consent” at all. It is a will to power.

There is really only one possible response here: If so, so what? In nearly every other conceivable context, that is exactly how consent works. Just because I kiss a woman doesn’t mean I’m obliged to have intercourse with her. I can tell my employer at any time for any reason, “Take this job and shove it!” Just because I accompany a workmate toward their home doesn’t mean I’m obligated to go with them all the way. I can stop donating in the middle of a series of transfusions—even if that means the recipient will die without them. I can invite a person into my home and kick them right back out.

So saying pregnant people may withdraw their consent to pregnancy at any time, for any reason, or no reason at all is simply taking the rules that apply to everyone else and applying it to them. To say that a pregnant person must carry the pregnancy just because they initially agreed to let the prenate use their body is to say that pregnant people are not rights-bearing human beings who deserve equal treatment.

And what of the “mentally immature, rights-bearing, human being that one intentionally brought into existence?” What of it? The woman I kiss has no right to my penis. My employer has no right to my labor. My workmate has no right to my company. The sick person has no right to my blood. A guest has no right to my home. And a prenate has no right to a pregnant person’s body. That means if consent is withdrawn, the other person’s rights are not violated. To say that prenates have a right to a pregnant person’s body is to give them special rights.

This is the difference between McDonagh on the one hand and Beckwith and Thomas on the other. When McDonagh concedes the fertilized ovum is a full member of the human community with the same rights as the person carrying it, she means it. B&T don’t.

Before moving to the core of their argument that consent to sex is consent to pregnancy, we will look at a couple side issues B&T raise. B&T believe issues against McDonagh’s argument could be raised on other grounds, but they only specifically get into a couple. They try to make out a case of negligence that requires a pregnant person to carry to term. Basically, we have a duty to exercise care so that a person likely to be aborted is not created. Put in the form of a syllogism, this is how it works:

1. Pregnancy is a foreseeable result of unprotected sex.

2. The fetus is a human person.

3. Therefore, one has a duty to avoid creating persons when abortion is foreseeable.

First, let’s note the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Even if the premises are true, they do not constitute a duty to avoid creating persons who are likely to be aborted.

Second, even if it is true that we have a duty of care not to bring people into existence when an abortion is foreseeable,⁵ no case of negligence can be made from its breach. As B&T remind us, “one is liable for negligence if one (1) has a duty, (2) breached a duty, and (3) caused harm as a result of breaching the duty.” However, breaching this alleged duty results in the creation of a person whose abortion is foreseeable. No one is harmed by being created.

We can dismiss the Hand Formula on the same grounds. We don’t need to calculate the burden of preventing an unwanted pregnancy against the expected cost of an injury because, again, creation is not an injury.⁶

In the midst of their core argument, B&T takes a stab at refuting McDonagh’s contention that self-defense applies to abortion even though the fetus is not deliberately doing what it does by comparing it to defending oneself against an incompetent (and therefore legally nonculpable) person. They ask you to imagine locking yourself in a room with such an individual knowing with certainty the individual would attack you. Could you then claim justifiable self-defense if you kill that individual? Probably not, since in most cases you can’t provoke a fight and then claim self-defense. Similarly, by virtue of inviting the conceptus into your body, you can’t claim self-defense in having an abortion.

However, this scenario faces the same problem we saw in counterexample two. You can’t invite someone who does not exist anywhere. If I claimed I locked Batman into a room with me knowing this would trigger an attack, but I killed him in self-defense, I would not be sent to jail. I would be sent to an insane asylum.

As mentioned previously, I am uncertain what B&T are attempting to do with their consent-to-sex as consent-to-pregnancy argument. In their words, “If one can show that McDonagh’s philosophical anthropology is controversial, then the moral intuitions that are grounded in it and to which she appeals in order to make her case are not prima facie correct.” Assuming they have successfully accomplished the goal of showing McDonagh’s anthropology is controversial, I am not certain what this is supposed to mean. I can think of two things:

1. McDonagh’s case is not sufficient to take to court, as it were.

2. B&T have offered an alternative account for the reader’s consideration.

Either way, I don’t imagine they think they have actually defeated McDonagh’s argument. They concede as much when they responded to a referee by saying, “All we are trying to do is to show that McDonagh does not have a prima facie case…” (emphasis added). Unfortunately, this doesn’t clarify what B&T are trying to do.

In both law and philosophy, a prima facie case is one that establishes the argument is basically sound. Prima facie cases are usually defeasible either by presenting additional evidence or through the circumstances of a specific case.⁷ Prosecutors obtain indictments by proving to a grand jury that their case, if unanswered, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. We have a prima facie obligation not to kill other people. However, the accused can defeat a prima facie case by presenting evidence and arguments that they are not guilty. The basic obligation not to kill other people can be overcome by the circumstances in which a person finds themselves, e.g., self-defense.

If B&T have shown McDonagh does not have a prima facie case as in sense 1, then all McDonagh needs to do is rebuild her argument so that it is stronger and try again. Perhaps such an argument would take into account the factors B&T identified.

But this doesn’t seem to be what they are doing. What they are doing is offering different evidence and arguments to show McDonagh has not proven her case. Instead of acting as grand jurors determining whether the prosecutor has enough a case to take to court, they are acting as defendants in a court case that has already begun. This would mean that McDonagh has established a prima facie case.

That leaves us with sense 2. B&T are merely trying to establish an alternative case and letting the reader decide. I myself noted that doing this has the benefit of providing interested but uncommitted third parties with clear choices. So if this is what they are trying to do, I’m not going to complain.

Yet this is not a satisfying account either. Beckwith’s history in particular militates against it. Beckwith doesn’t merely argue that abortion is immoral. He wants pregnant people to carry to term in nearly all cases, and he wants the state to legally enforce it. Merely presenting an alternative case and letting the reader decide will not accomplish this.

Indeed, I suspect B&T originally intended to offer a more full-throttled case than simply trying to show McDonagh doesn’t have a prima facie case. Their case that consent to sex is consent to pregnancy is built on the premise that the purpose of sex is procreation. Let’s take at some of the things they say:

“[I]t seems correct to say that the telos (or purpose) of reproductive organs is reproduction (i.e., pregnancy), for the sperm and ova seem designed for that very purpose.”

“Thus, to understand one’s self and one’s nature is to understand that one’s sexual organs are designed for procreation.”

“[McDonagh] maintains that it is permissible to engage in a pleasurable act whose design is to bring into existence a vulnerable, defenseless, and dependent human person….”

“[T]he mother, by virtue of the sexual act’s reproductive purpose….”

Then towards the end of the paper, they shift the goalposts and only say “procreation is part of the purpose of sexual intercourse.” Notably this happens during a discussion of a referee’s objections to their teleological argument. Apparently, the referee’s objections were substantial enough that they tempered their argument. No longer able to meet the burden of defeating McDonagh’s argument, they are now contenting themselves making a case that has a substantially lower burden.

Whichever sense they intend, once they pull back to the position that procreation is only part of the purpose of sex, their case can no longer serve either the senses discussed. In fact, their case falls apart entirely. Let me explain.

If we were to construct their case with a syllogism, it would look something like this:

1. The purpose of sex is procreation.

2. When someone consents to sex, they consent to the entire process of procreation.

3. Withdrawing consent after a child has been created is unconscionable.

4. Therefore, a person who became pregnant as a result of voluntary sex may not obtain an abortion.

This may not be a perfect representation, but it will serve the purpose. We could pick on any of the premises to show the argument is not sound, but since B&T are merely trying to show that McDonagh does not have a prima facie case, we need not actually do so at this point. Our point here is that in order for B&T to actually make that case, premise 1 absolutely, positively needs to be true. To demonstrate this, let’s change premise 1 and see what happens.

1a. Part of the purpose of sex is procreation.

Changing the premise this way renders the entire argument invalid. If procreation is only part of the purpose of sex, there is no longer any reason to believe that by consenting to sex, a person is consenting to procreation. In other words, if procreation is only part of the purpose of sex, then sex and pregnancy are severable—the very point McDonagh is making. Once severed, the idea that consent to sex does not mean consent to pregnancy has a solid foundational basis.⁸

Likewise, if procreation is only part of the purpose of sex, the argument can no longer serve as an alternative explanation for maintaining that consent to sex is consent to pregnancy. To serve as a fully fledged alternative to McDonagh’s anthropology, sex and pregnancy need to be so firmly connected that it can reasonably be said that consent to one is consent to the other. But if procreation is only part of, as opposed to the purpose of sex, the solid connection between sex and pregnancy is lost.

As part of their argument that McDonagh does not have a prima facie case, B&T try to put McDonagh in the horns of a dilemma. On one hand, McDonagh cannot deny things have a natural purpose, since that would undermine her argument that humans have natural rights. On the other, once teleology is admitted to the discussion, she can’t deny the belief that sex is part of pregnancy is at least as well grounded as her own.

I am unclear about how this is supposed to help their argument. B&T are ostensibly arguing against McDonagh’s contention that consent to sex is not consent to pregnancy. As such, whether sex is part of pregnancy seems irrelevant. McDonagh is not denying that sex and pregnancy are connected; she is arguing that they are not connected in such a way that consent to one entails consent to the other. Up until this point in their argument, B&T were arguing that sex and pregnancy are so firmly connected that consent to one entails consent to the other. This part of the argument seems to come out of left field.

Regardless, we’ll go ahead and grant this dilemma somehow rebuts McDonagh’s contention that consent to sex is not consent to pregnancy. We will go even further and grant they have successfully painted McDonagh into a corner.

We can be so generous because it is easy to cut through the Gordian knot B&T think they have tied: deny premise 1. As we’ve already shown, the ability to deny McDonagh has a prima facie case absolutely, positively depends on premise 1 being true. Even retreating to the position that procreation is only part of the purpose of sex is enough to make their case collapse. If premise 1 simply isn’t true, then McDonagh can simultaneously admit teleology and deny their case is at least as well grounded as her own.

It would be all too easy to focus on B&T’s repetitive use of the word design in their argument. Design implies at least one designer and we could simply demand B&T produce the designer(s) so the purpose of the design can be explained. That would clarify the issue once and for all. But that would be grossly unfair.

Instead, what we are going to do is look at the human species as it is. It makes sense to say that the purpose of sex for many animals is procreation because these animals only have sex when the female is in season. Nonsocial animals meet, mate, and go their separate ways.

Humans are not like this. They have evolved away from the estrus cycle entirely. Among other things, this means humans have sex even when it is unlikely pregnancy will result. Worse from the standpoint of procreation, humans have evolved to the point where even females themselves usually can’t tell when they are ovulating. This means that if a couple were trying to achieve pregnancy, they can’t tell on their own when the optimal time to achieve the 10% chance⁹ they’ll actually succeed is.

If the purpose of human sex is procreation, then nature has an insane way of showing it. Forget about sex when one partner is already pregnant, homosexual sex, oral sex, anal sex, masturbation or any number of human sexual practices that can’t possibly result in procreation. Just focusing on vaginal intercourse, the physiology of human sex can only ensure an enormous amount of waste in terms of time, energy, and resources.

Consider human breasts. Humans are the only known species to have permanent breasts. Breasts are a locus of the human sexual response, both in terms of attracting mates and in sexual activity itself. Breast play, oral and manual, is a common part of sexual activity. Breasts undergo various changes during sexual arousal, and nipple sensations are sent to the same area of the brain as sensations from the clitoris, vagina, and cervix. Some of those who possess them report having orgasms from nipple stimulation alone. It would be fair to say the human breasts serves the dual purposes of mammary gland and sex organ. This is totally unnecessary when it comes to reproduction.

And for the pièce de résistance, consider the human clitoris. As far as we can tell, the sole function of the human clitoris is to enable sexual pleasure. It literally does nothing else. All it does is sit there, waiting to be stimulated in order to give its possessor intense pleasure. Think about this: In the human clitoris, we have a fully fledged, honest to God sex organ that does absolutely nothing for reproduction. As I’m sure many people who have been pregnant can remind us, it is utterly irrelevant that the female feel pleasure for reproduction to take place.

If there is any one single piece of evidence that shows the purpose of human sex is not procreation, the clit is it.

We could of course point to other problems with B&T’s philosophical anthropology. However, that is not necessary for our purpose. We only need to show that McDonagh could get out of the dilemma B&T thought they had her in. We have done that.

Beckwith and Thomas are trying to establish that McDonagh’s argument is problematic, if not wrong. Even at this lower standard, they have failed. Their counterexamples are fatally flawed, the first because it makes an inapt comparison, and the second because it asserts an impossibility. Their effort to show McDonagh does not have a prima facie case that consent to sex does not entail consent to pregnancy also falls short. It requires their first and most basic premise to be true, and that premise turns out to be false.

NOTES

1(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

2I say apparently because the first counterexample is clearly a reductio, attempting to take one of McDonagh’s contentions to the point of absurdity to demonstrate her principle is wrong. The second counterexample does not have the same form. However, both are meant to show McDonagh’s arguments have undesirable implications for “the traditional pro-choice position.”

3See my somewhat more sarcastic response to a similar argument.

4“A Defense of Abortion,” in Rights, Restitution, & Risk: Essays in Moral Theory. Ed by William Parent. (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986), 11.

5As a sidenote, one wonders how anyone could possibly bring into existence a person whose death from abortion is foreseeable. Outside of IVF methods (and even then conception is not guaranteed), all one can do is have unprotected sex in an attempt to create such a person. But having unprotected sex is not sufficient to create a person. Furthermore, having an abortion is a decision one makes subsequent to becoming pregnant. If one doesn’t foresee becoming pregnant, one can’t foresee they are going to abort. The closest we could come is to say that a person can take a risk of becoming pregnant intending to have an abortion if it actually happens. However, since the actual decision to have an abortion is subsequent to actually becoming pregnant, there is still an opportunity to change one’s mind, meaning death from abortion is not foreseeable in any meaningful way.

6For a more fully developed explication, see Ann Garry’s “Abortion: Models of Responsibility.”

7This description is somewhat oversimplified.

8As a sidenote, if procreation is only a purpose of sex, then a similar argument can be made against the so-called perverted faculty argument.

9Foster, Diana Greene. The Turnaway Study: Ten Years, a Thousand Women, and the Consequences of Having—or Being Denied—an Abortion (p. 52). Scribner. Kindle Edition.