I recently came across an interesting Honors thesis by Nicholas Masferrer Ramirez, The Limping Violinist: Why Thomson’s Defense of Abortion Does Not Establish the Conclusion that Abortion is Morally Permissible. As the title suggests, it is yet another attempt to refute Judith Jarvis Thomson’s "A Defense of Abortion." Like other attempts, it fails. However, it is an eighty page pdf file, and even skipping over arguments I’ve already engaged, it would still take about forty pages to thoroughly debunk.
Instead, I’m opting to focus on Part IV: The Teleological Objection (55-68). This is the only section where Ramirez is arguing abortion is morally impermissible, rather than simply attempting to prove Thomson’s “Defense” doesn’t show abortion is permissible. Nothing in this part depends of Parts I-III being true, so we’re not missing anything important.
The interesting part of this argument is that it attempts to use teleological reasoning to show that abortion is impermissible. However, he is almost immediately reduced to admitting his argument “would only apply to those who accept a teleological metaphysical view” (55). This in itself seems odd. Ramirez is clear he finds abortion generally impermissible. Making a case only for those who accept a certain worldview will not get to general impermissibility. That would still leave open the question of why abortion would be impermissible to anyone who does not accept that worldview.
This is a problem that affects Ramirez's entire paper. He is attempting to show that Thomson's violinist scenario does not show abortion is permissible even if one is allowed to disconnect from the violinist. As reliant on teleological considerations as his arguments are, they can only find purchase with those who accept his worldview. Thus he fails in his task generally even if he is successful among those who hold to teleological metaphysics.
Nevertheless, Ramirez holds that pro-choice philosophers would do well to “grant an Aristotelian teleology” (56). But why should they? Typically a philosopher arguing for the permissibility of abortion aims to show that abortion is generally permissible, not that it is permissible for a certain subset of the population. If one accepts teleological metaphysics and believes Ramirez's arguments are sound, one is certainly free not to have an abortion.
While I do not fully accept Aristotelian metaphysics, as I mentioned elsewhere, I am inclined to accept as true statements such as “the purpose of uteruses is to gestate prenates.” However, I have serious doubts that such statements can be parleyed into moral obligations. While this may not precisely make me part of the audience Ramirez is addressing, there is enough common ground for Ramirez to work with.
The question before us is this: Even if one accepts uteruses are for gestation, does Ramirez’s argument defeat bodily rights?
Preliminary Clarifications
Ramirez perpetuates some misconceptions about pregnancy. Since the actual facts will have some bearing on my response, I will begin by clarifying those misconceptions.
Ramirez places great emphasis on the fact that uterus bearers can live without their uterus, but fetuses cannot live without them. This is true insofar as it goes, but it is radically incomplete. The uterus is not the only organ that the fetus needs to stay alive. It also needs the mother's circulatory system, respiratory system, digestive system and kidneys to stay alive. Cut off the blood flow to the placenta, and the fetus will not be able to obtain nutrients and oxygen and cannot dispose of carbon dioxide and urea. Therefore it will surely die.
Ramirez heavily relies on an argument by Jim Stone1 and attempts to rebut criticisms made by David Boonin.2 Ramierez responds to only two of Boonin's objections, going so far as to modify Stone's argument to clear the argument from the charge of begging the question. However, Boonin offered other, perhaps more substantial, criticisms of Stone’s argument. As we shall see, Ramirez's modified argument is still subject to the criticisms he ignored.
The Nucleus of the Argument
The basis of Ramirez’s argument is pointing out a disanalogy between Thomson’s violinist and pregnancy. The purpose of filtering kidneys is to filter blood, whereas the purpose of uteruses is to gestate fetusus, i.e., to provide for another person. “Thus, the violinist does not have a right to your kidneys in the same way an unborn child has a right to her mother’s uterus” (55).
The first thing we should notice is that, formulated this way, the argument is invalid. Just because something is meant to benefit someone other than oneself does not by itself give anyone a right to that thing. Apartment complexes are meant to shelter people other than the owner, but that does not mean I have the right to take up residence in a given apartment without the owner’s permission.
There is a missing middle, as it were. Ramirez is attempting to fill the gap.
Filling the Gap
To fill the gap, Ramirez draws upon a thought experiment proposed by Jim Stone. To briefly recapitulate, Stone proposes we imagine an alien species. At the age of seventy, a member of this species splits into two distinct entities and ceases to exist. Both newly formed individuals have an unambiguous right to life. However, the fissioning is not quite complete for an additional nine months. During this time, one of the individuals has fully developed and functioning organs, whereas the other has vital organs still in development. The two are connected by a band of flesh through which a common bloodstream allows the incompletely formed split to use the organs of the other.
Supposing Stone himself is the individual with fully formed organs, would he be entitled to separate himself from the needy offshoot, George? Stone (and Ramirez) say no, using this reasoning:
The principle which justifies such a claim seems to be this: An organism with a strong right to life has a right to the continued use of the biological equipment, the use of which it acquires through the normal process of biological creation typical to its species, upon which its life depends. (qtd at 57)
Having stated the case, Ramirez now turns to respond to two of Boonin’s objections. Remember these are not the only objections Boonin had to Stone’s argument. However, we will leave those other objections aside for the time being and deal with Ramirez’s responses.
Responding to Ramirez’s Argumentum Ad Absurdum
Assuming that it would be morally impermissible for Stone to unplug himself from George, Boonin argues there is a relevant difference between the fissioned individuals and a fetus making use of its mothers body. In the case of Stone and George, they both began using Stone’s organs at the same time. By contrast, pregnant people clearly had prior ownership of their uteruses well before a fetus took up residence in it (DoA 245).
Ramirez responds if we accept this argument, we would have to accept that living organ donors can reclaim their organs even at the cost of the recipient’s life. I am unclear how Ramirez gets this. Possibly the argument is inspired by Boonin's language showing the pregnant people have prior ownership of their uteruses: "The organs inside her body were provided to her by nature well before the fetus began to make use of them" (DoA 245). Ramirez is apparently equating prior ownership with original ownership.
If so, we need only make a slight modification that will have the same result without the implication Ramirez asserts.
Consider Jack and Jill. Jack is a transgender man who for obvious reasons has no desire to be pregnant. Jill does want to have children some day, but her uterus is defective and will not carry any pregnancy. Jack, nice guy that he is, decides to donate his uterus to Jill. Although Jill's uterus was provided to her by Jack rather than nature, nothing has changed. Jill can still claim prior ownership vis a vis the fetus, unlike the case of Stone and George. Even if we were forced to conclude Stone could not disconnect from George, that still wouldn't mean Jill couldn't have an abortion on Thomsonian grounds.
Presumably Boonin never had any intention to imply organ donors could reclaim their donations and would agree with this modification. Regardless, with this modification, Ramirez’s response fails.
Nevertheless, we’re not going to leave things here. The real concern is that Ramirez is trying to assert “prior ownership of an organ is irrelevant in regards to who is entitled to that organ” (59). But even if his counterargument against Boonin could be sustained, this conclusion would still be jumping the gun.
Consider Ramirez’s case of Mary and John. Presumably Ramirez would agree that Mary, the kidney recipient, could be unplugged from Thomson’s violinist. The fact that she is the prior owner of the kidney certainly would be a factor in that judgment.
Indeed, prior ownership certainly plays a role in judgments about who is entitled to what—and usually it is the decisive factor. If Stone and George jointly inherited a house, it is clear Stone could not deny George’s use of it. However, if Stone alone inherited the house, it is just as clear George can claim no entitlement to use it.
It is certainly possible that the pregnant person’s ownership of their uterus is in fact irrelevant to whether the fetus is entitled to that organ. But Ramirez would actually have to make that case.
Reformulating Stone’s Thought Experiment
In response to Boonin’s charge Stone was begging the question, Ramirez reformulates Stone’s argument as a syllogism:
(1) A person is entitled to use any organ whose natural function is to keep him alive.
(2) A fetus is a person. (Assumption granted by Boonin and Thomson for the sake of argument.)
(3) A fetus is entitled to use any organ whose natural function is to keep him alive. (Follows from 1 and 2)
(4) The uterus of a fetus’s mother is an organ whose natural function is to keep him alive.
Therefore,
(5) A fetus is entitled to use the uterus of his mother. (Follows from 3 and 4). (59-60)
Ramirez claims if Boonin denied premise (1), it would have unsavory implications, such as the state claiming the use of people’s vital organs. But it seems to me that premise (1) as it stands allows that anyway. It would give the violinist a claim to your kidneys because the natural function of a kidney is to keep someone alive. The key point of Ramirez’s formulation is left unstated in premise (1): it is irrelevant whether that organ is internal or external to the person in need of it. Indeed, he asserts that distinguishing internal and external organs is an ad hoc one. So if the fetus is entitled to the pregnant person’s uterus because he needs it to keep him alive, then Thomson’s violinist is entitled to your kidneys because he needs them to keep him alive.
Also remember that the uterus is not the only external organ the fetus needs to keep it alive. It also needs, at a minimum, the pregnant person’s heart, lungs, stomach, intestines and kidneys to keep it alive. Presumably, Ramirez would affirm that the fetus is also entitled to the use of these organs. Otherwise, he would have to agree that an abortion could be performed by a method that cuts off the fetus’ access to nutrients, oxygen, and waste disposal. But if he is unwilling to do this, then it becomes difficult to deny the violinist has a right to your kidneys.
Ramirez also says that if Boonin denied premise (1), he would also have to deny George has any right to use Stone’s organs. Here, it should be pointed out that is exactly what Boonin did. Now we turn to an objection made by Boonin but ignored by Ramirez.
Boonin pointed out that Stone’s principle contains two distinct claims. First, George acquired the use of Stone’s organs through a natural process. Second, that natural process was the normal means of reproducing for his species. Boonin rejects the first claim. It does not follow from the fact that George acquired the use of Stone’s organs through the function of the common band of flesh they happen to have means he has a right to use those organs. Thus, Stone can detach himself from George (DoA 243-244).
To illustrate, let us extend our earlier metaphor of Stone and George jointly inheriting a house. Suppose that instead of jointly inheriting the entire house, Stone only inherits one half the house and George the other. As it so happens, the air conditioning unit is on Stone’s side of the house. Thus, George receives heating and cooling because of the preexisting duct work. George will be able to install an air conditioner, but it will take nine months. Does it follow from these facts that George has a right to use the air conditioner that is clearly on Stone’s side of the property? No. Absent any compelling reason to the contrary, Stone is within his rights to cut off heating and cooling to George’s part of the house.
It is only if the first claim is vindicated that the objection Ramirez is addressing, that Stone is begging the question, comes into play. This means even if Ramirez has successfully reformulated the argument to avoid begging the question, Boonin’s rejection of the first claim still stands. And Ramirez doesn’t even try offering a rebuttal to Boonin’s rejection of the first claim.
Surrogate Mothers and Spaceships
Ramirez can escape the conclusion that you must remain hooked to the violinist by insisting on another unstated part of premise (1), that the use of the organs are acquired through the normal reproductive process. So now premise (1) will look like this:
(1)c A person is entitled to use any organ, internal or external to himself, whose natural function is to keep him alive if he acquired the use of the organ through normal reproductive processes.
Even Ramirez sees an immediate problem with this formulation: it does not cover cases he wants it to cover. It is at best unclear whether rape is part of the normal reproductive process. And artificial methods of becoming pregnant certainly are not part of the normal reproductive process. Indeed, Ramirez agrees that, at least in the artificially achieved pregnancy, the fetus would not have a right to the pregnant person’s uterus.
Ramirez turns to another argument to establish that even if the fetus has no right to the pregnant person’s uterus, that still wouldn’t necessarily justify an abortion:
Let us return to our spaceship case. Recall in this example, I have a
spaceship stocked with enough food for two people on this nine month
voyage and I fully own the rights to the spaceship and everything on
it. After taking off for my nine month voyage, I discover that my
two-year-old son has snuck on board. Let us now ask a similar
question that we asked in the original version: do I have the right
to kick my son off the spaceship, thereby killing him, since he does
not have any right to the spaceship? [cite]
Before getting to my substantial objections, the are a couple things to notice about this argument. First, if this argument is enough to prohibit someone who became pregnant through artificial means from having an abortion, then it is also enough to prohibit you from being unhooked from the violinist. After all, if not having a right to one’s uterus is not a sufficient condition for having an abortion, then the fact that the unconscious violinist has no right to your kidneys is not sufficient reason to demand unhooking. Second, if this argument is enough to prohibit someone from having an abortion, then it no longer matters whether uteruses are for gestating prenates. We are out of the realm of teleological metaphysics entirely.
Now on to more substantial objections. There is a huge difference between Ramirez’s stowaway son and an unwanted fetus using a pregnant person’s body. The stowaway son is violating Ramirez’s property rights, whereas the unwanted fetus is violating the pregnant person’s right to bodily integrity. So it would not follow that agreeing Ramirez may not eject his son means a pregnant person may not have an abortion. Indeed, the right to bodily integrity is so fundamental that we regard killing someone trying to rape or kidnap you as justified self-defense. By parity of reasoning, pregnant people may kill the fetus to end the violation of their bodily integrity.
But suppose Ramirez is willing to concede cases where the fetus did not obtain the use of the pregnant persons organs through the normal reproductive process. We are now confronted with another Boonin objection Ramirez ignored. Boonin asks why it should matter that the use of the organ was acquired through the normal reproductive process (DoA 244-245). Once again, Ramirez doesn’t even attempt to answer that question.
The provision that the organ usage be acquired through the normal reproductive process can only serve one purpose: accommodate the intuition you are allowed to unplug yourself from Thomson’s violinist. But without any reason to believe acquirement through the normal reproductive process makes any difference, we can only conclude it is an attempt to give the fetus special rights. This serves as another piece of evidence that the abortion debate is really about who gets to control the bodies of uterus bearers.
NOTES
1Ramirez cites Jim Stone, “Abortion and the Control of Human Bodies,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 17, no. 1 (1983): 77-85.
2In A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridgue University Press, 2005): 245-246. Hereafter, A Defense of Abortion will be cited in text as (DoA x), where x is the page number. Boonin also cites the same article as Ramirez. I currently have no access to Stone’s article, and therefore cannot properly evaluate whether Ramirez and/or Boonin have adequately captured Stone’s argument. However, since Ramirez does not allege Boonin misinterprets or misrepresents Stone’s argument, the point is moot.
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